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BUILDING NATIONAL INTEGRITY THROUGH CORRUPTION
ERADICATION IN SOUTH KOREA
Pan Suk Kim
ABSTRACT
Since South Korea gained a substantial degree of political and economic development
in recent history, the South Korean government has tried to eradicate corruption by
introducing institutional frameworks in addition to a number of new laws and
institutions. As a matter of fact, the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception
Index score of South Korea is improving over time, but it still far behind other leading
countries. The purpose of this article is to review the South Korean Government’s efforts
for curbing corruption. This paper first reviews the development of major anti-
corruption infrastructure such as the anti-corruption legislation and the independent
agency for anti-corruption in the South Korean government, followed by discussion of
the development of major anti-corruption measures, the international evaluation on
corruption, and the role of civil society for curbing corruption. After that, there are the
policy implications and the conclusion.
INTRODUCTION
According to public-office-centered definitions of corruption, 1 corruption in
government is defined as the abuse or misuse of public office or authority for private
gains and benefits that occurs at the interface of the public and private sectors.2
Whenever a public official has discretionary power over the distribution of benefits or
costs to the private sector, incentives for bribery are created (Rose-Ackerman, 1978,
1997). Klitgaard (1988) asserts that illicit behavior flourishes when agents have
monopoly power over clients, when agents have great discretion, and when
accountability of agents to the principal is weak. Corruption poses serious challenges to
development: it undermines democracy and good governance by subverting formal
processes, it reduces accountability and representation in policymaking, it suspends the
rule of law, it results in the unequal provision of services, and it erodes the institutional
capacity of government as procedures are disregarded (Dininio, Kpundeh, and Leiken,
1  Arnold Heidenheimer (2001) provided three classifications of corruption: public-office-centered,
market-centered, and public-interest-centered definitions.
2  Transparency International and UNDP (1999) share this kind of definition. See Transparency
International’s homepage at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006/faq.
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1998).
The public sector increasingly recognizes that good governance requires the highest
standards of public integrity, openness, and transparency, as well as a sound criminal
justice system. This can be illustrated by the pervasive effects these factors have on
government performance, the use of public resources, the general morale in public
services,  the  legitimacy  of  the  state,  and  the  rule  of  law.  Launching  programs  to  deal
with corruption are a precondition for overall public sector reform, and progress in
curbing corruption is considered evidence of will and commitment to good governance.
For decades, the South Korean government has stressed the significance of curbing
corruption. The South Korean public had a particular antipathy toward political
instability, which can be attributed to prevailing political corruption and serious political
scandals in the past. The corrupt practices of politicians and high officials have
generated an atmosphere of resentment, frustration, and distrust for many years.
Previous authoritarian administrations, however, tended to consider anticorruption
initiatives merely as a means to soothe public outrage over the unfairness of corrupt
public service and public officials. Moreover, authoritarian regimes used anti-corruption
initiatives as a means for removing key political opponents from the political arena.
When authoritarian regimes were over, however, the South Korean government was
concerned with more than the political aspects of corruption. It perceived the collusion
of bureaucrat and business as one of the most crucial obstacles to a free market
economy and good governance. Such collusion contributed to South Korea’s economic
crisis in the past. Corruption undermines economic development by causing
considerable distortion and inefficiency. Corruption increases the cost of business
through the price of illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating
with officials, and the risk of breached agreements or detection (Dininio, Kpundeh, and
Leiken, 1998).
Various anti-corruption initiatives had taken place by various administrations, but
substantial changes appeared during early 1990s. During the Kim Young-sam
Administration (1993-1998), the Real Name Financial Transactions System was
executed by the Presidential Emergency Order for national finance and economy in
1993. It was a significant step toward financial transparency in banning the use of
anonymous financial accounts. Later, the Act on Real Name Financial Transactions and
Guarantee of Secrecy was enacted in 1997 in order to solve partial defects, such as
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inconveniences in financial transactions following verification of real names and the
anxieties about tax investigations under the Presidential Emergency Order. President
Kim Young-sam also strengthened the role of the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI)
as  a de jure anti-corruption agency 3  and established the Corruption Prevention
Committee  (CPC)  as  an  advisory  body  of  the  BAI’s  chairman  in  the  task  of  fighting
corruption (Quah, 1999: 181). In addition, he seriously pursued regulatory reforms
through activities of the Administrative Reform Committee, and such deregulation
contributed to the reduction of corrupted practices in government.
However, much more salient transformations took place during the Kim Dae-jung
Administration in modern South Korean history. President Kim requested the Office of
the Prime Minister (OPM) to develop more systematic anti-corruption programs.4 In
1999, the OPM announced comprehensive programs including the following five issues:
(1)  the  establishment  of  a  special  committee  on  anti-corruption;  (2)  promulgation  of  a
basic law on the prevention of corruption; (3) the development of a public awareness
campaign; (4) the development of a campaign encouraging citizen participation in
corruption detection; and (5) administrative reforms in corruption-prone areas. This plan
brought a significant development on corruption eradication and the author labeled it
here as the “Kim Dae-jung Plan of 1999” on anti-corruption. Furthermore, President
Kim formed the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) based on the Basic Law on
Administrative Regulations of 1998 in order to intensively review existing regulations
and screen regulations to be introduced or deregulated.5
Current Administration (Roh Moo-hyun Administration: 2003-2008) revised the Public
Office Election Act to minimize corrupted practices in the process of the public office
election and renamed the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC)
to the National Integrity Commission in order to encourage a full-scale national
integrity instead of curbing narrowly-focused anti-corruption.6 In accordance with the
Article 8 of the Anti-Corruption Act, the Code of Conduct for Public Officials (CCPO)
went into force on May 19, 2003 to lay down behavioral guidelines for public officials
3 For more information, visit the BAI’s homepage at http://english.bai.go.kr/.
4 In 1999, the Prime Minister was Kim Jong-pil and his office had a substantial degree of autonomy of
power in comparison with other former Prime Ministers.
5 For more details, visit the Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC)’s homepage at http://www.rrc.go.kr.
6 KICAC’s Korean name was changed as mentioned earlier. However, its English name still remains the
same.
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in their private and public life. 7  Furthermore, applications of information and
communication technology (ICT) in public service delivery reduced opportunities of
corrupted practices in government.8 The E-Government Readiness Index of Korea was
the 5th place among the UN member states in 2004 and 2005, following USA,
Denmark, Sweden, and UK (UN/DESA, 2005).
South Korean government’s anti-corruption efforts were somewhat political, symbolic,
or limited in its nature before the 1990s. Since the 1990s, however, realistic and
practical measures for corruption eradication have been developed. Such development
might  be  correlated  with  political  and  economic  developments  in  South  Korea.
Accordingly, it would be interesting to see how the South Korean government’s anti-
corruption measures have been developed and what measures are taking place; where
and  in  what  ways.  It  would  be  also  interesting  to  see  the  evaluation  of  South  Korean
government’s anti-corruption efforts from a professional international organization.
Thus, this paper first reviews the development of major anti-corruption infrastructure
such as the anti-corruption legislation and the independent agency for anti-corruption in
the South Korean government, followed by discussion of the development of major
anti-corruption measures, the international evaluation on corruption, and the role of civil
society for curbing corruption. After that, policy implications and conclusion follow.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR ANTI-CORRUPTION
INFRASTRUCTURE: ANTI-CORRUPTION ACT AND THE INDEPENDENT
AGECY FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION
In 1999, the Special Commission on Anti-Corruption (SCAC) was established by
President Kim Dae-jung to promote anti-corruption measures. However, the SCAC was
found to be ineffective in curbing corruption because it was just an advisory body of the
President without substantial administrative backup machinery; and all members of the
commission are non-standing members. Consequently, there was a growing demand in
government and society to restructure a special body for combating corruption along
with the anti-corruption legislation.
7 Based on the CCPO, 324 central and local administrative agencies put their own codes of conduct in
place, which reflect their individual situation.
8 For example, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) has developed a web-based system that
allows citizens to monitor corruption-prone applications for permits and approvals. This Online
Procedures Enhancement for civil applications (OPEN) system makes it easier to raise questions in the
event that any irregularities are detected (http://www.unpan.org/training-open.asp). .
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The Citizens’ Coalition for Promulgating a Corruption Prevention Law (composed of 38
NGOs in South Korea) was established in early 2000 and it requested the National
Assembly and major political parties to make a new law for corruption prevention. After
that, both the then ruling, and opposition parties, prepared a bill on anti-corruption in
late 2000 and then enacted the Anti-Corruption Act on July 24, 2001. The purpose of
this Act is to serve to create the clean climate of the civil service and society by
preventing and efficiently regulating the acts of corruption. 9  In 2001, the Money
Laundering Prevention Act was also enacted. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct for
Maintaining the Integrity of Public Officials (Presidential Decree Number 17906) was
enacted on February 18, 2003 and it went into force May 19, 2003 at central and local
administrative organs and autonomous education authorities for integration with
existing regulations.10 Thus it is fair to say that major basic pillars of the anti-corruption
infrastructures have been established during the Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998-
2003).11
In  accordance  with  Article  10  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Act  enacted  in  2001,  the  Korea
Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) was established on January
25th, 2002. During the establishment process, however, there was a serious struggle
among key stakeholders such as the prosecutors and the police, although it was
overruled by the President and public opinion. At onetime, the central government was
considering creating the Bureau of Investigation of Public Officials’ Corruption as a
quasi-autonomous body in the Pubic Prosecutor’s Office because the prosecutors
strongly demanded to have it within their territory. In addition, the police also lobbied to
have  such  a  function  within  the  National  Policy  Agency.  Moreover,  many  lawyers
among members of the National Assembly and lawyers of the legal policy community
did not fully support the establishment of KICAC because of the different sectoral
group interests. Accordingly, KICAC’s functions have not been fully equipped as
compared with Singapore and Hong Kong. This is a classic example of conflict of
interests among key stakeholders.
9 Reporting corruption cases is one of the most effective ways to bring corruption under control. Under
this recognition, the Anti-Corruption Act provides for a system of protection and rewards for whistle-
blowers and informants - and even their relatives. It bans disclosing their identity without their consent or
putting them at any disadvantage.
10 The new ethics code is different from its predecessors in its achievability and strong binding power.
11 The Kim Administration initiated a bold reform right after the IMF bailout in 1997. The Act on
Preventing Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions was also enacted in
1999.
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In comparison, South Korea is a latecomer in Asia in establishing a specialized
independent anti-corruption agency: Singapore established the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in 195212; Malaysia organized the Anti-Corruption Agency
(ACA) in 196713; Hong Kong made the Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC) in 197414; Thailand established the National Counter Corruption Commission
(NCCC) in 199915; and Indonesia organized the Corruption Eradication Commission
(CEC) in 2003.16 As a matter of fact, there are three are different patterns of corruption
control around the world: (1) anti-corruption laws without specific agency to implement
these laws; (2) the combination of anti-corruption laws and several anti-corruption
agencies; and (3) the impartial implementation of comprehensive anti-corruption laws
by a specific anti-corruption agency (Quah, 2003: 16). Asian Countries mentioned
above uses the third pattern of corruption control.17
KICAC is an independent governmental organization established under the President to
perform the improvement of laws and institutions for the prevention of corruption and
the formulation and implementation of anti-corruption policies.18 KICAC Secretariat,
staffed with 205 employees as of 2006,19 is responsible for presenting anti-corruption
policies to the board of the Commission and handling administrative affairs in
accordance with the board's decision. It has four bureaus including inspection
headquarters, legal affairs management, policy planning, and public relations. As of
12 Http://www.cpib.gov.sg.
13 Http://www.bpr.gov.my.
14  ICAC  has  a  strength  of  1,314  staff  as  of  2006,  with  the  majority  serving  on  contracts.
Http://www.icac.org.hk.
15 Http://www.nccc.thaigov.net.
16 Http://www.kpk.go.id.
17 Outside the Asia-Pacific region, however, the Anti-corruption Bureau in Tanzania, for example, faced
considerable public criticism particularly in the post Julius Nyerere years (TI, 1999: 87). Therefore, it is
worthy to consider the fact that having an independent anti-corruption agency does not guarantee the
success of corruption eradication because an independent anti-corruption agency model is unlikely to be
right for every country (Johnston, 1999: 225).
18 The board of the Commission consists of nine commissioners, three of whom are appointed by the
President as standing members. The rest, six non-standing members, are appointed or designated by the
President, three members on the recommendation of the National assembly and three by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court. All commissioners serve a term of three years. For more details, visit KICAC’s
homepage at http://www.kicac.go.kr.
19 Detailed information can be found at http://www.kicac.go.kr.
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2006, its annual budget is approximately 19.6 billion won (equivalent to approximately
US$20 million). In comparison, ICAC in Hong Kong had a total staff of 1, 286
members and a budget of HK$686.7 million (US$88 million) in 2001; and Singapore’s
CPIB had a total staff of 80 members and a budget of S$10.7 million (US$6.3 million)
in 2001 (Quah, 2004).20
In a nutshell, KICAC is a major national anti-corruption authority in South Korea, but
some critics indicate that it lacks investigative powers (Quah, 2006).21 Nonetheless, the
presence of such an organization exclusively in charge of anti-corruption measures
indicates the South Korean government’s will and readiness to tackle corruption issues
as the top priority of national development agendas. The role of a newly created agency
is usually weak in the beginning of its establishment so it is expected that the function
and the role of KICAC will be strengthened over time in the future.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES BY
KICAC
The launching of KICAC in 2002 was of considerable significance in that it is a
national-level anti-corruption agency that plays a crucial role in the government's fight
against corruption by implementing a broad range of measures to prevent corruption,
provides checks and balances between authorities in power, and, for the first time in the
nation's history, introduced the whistle-blower protection and reward system. KICAC is
currently carrying out almost comprehensive policy measures for anti-corruption in both
prevention and punishment dimensions. Among such programs, notable major anti-
corruption measures are: (1) institutional improvement for corruption prevention; (2)
handling corruption reports; (3) protecting and rewarding whistle-blowers; (4)
assessment  of  anti-corruption  activities;  and  (5)  raising  public  awareness  on  the
corruption issue through the code of conduct for public officials and anti-corruption
training.
20 South Korea’s per capita expenditure of US$0.44 for anti-corruption is much lower than Hong Kong’s
US$12.57 per capital expenditure as of 2001. For more information, visit the Asian Development Bank’s
homepage at http://adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/GB/GovernanceBrief11.pdf.
21 KICAC has an inspection headquarters with inspection officers, but critics say that the authority of
inspection officers is limited in comparison with other law enforcement agencies. As a matter of fact, the
Prosecutor’s  Office  and  the  National  Policy  Agency  opposed  the  establishment  of  KICAC  during  the
policy development process for establishing an independent anti-corruption agency.
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Institutional Improvement for Corruption Prevention
The South Korean central government made systematic measures for institutional
improvement, comprised of three tasks (voluntary, special and common tasks).
First, the voluntary task specifies that each government agency should identify and
remove corruption factors from its law and regulation. KICAC conducts an extensive
examination of the laws and regulations in the public sector. Second, the special task
identifies that each government agency should refocus its anti-corruption efforts on the
areas that are prone to fraud and corruption. KICAC works to make sure that the
specific areas (i.e., taxation, public projects and award of contracts, inspection, public
corporations, transactions with foreign business, etc) receive policy priorities. Third, the
common task, whose successful implementation will have a positive spill-over effect on
society as a whole, is made up of several tasks: revise corruption-causing laws and
regulations, enhance transparency in administrative procedures, encourage public
involvement, foster a corruption-free environment, and ensure detection and punishment
of corruptors.
Handling of Corruption Reports
KICAC  has  Inspection  Headquarters  (IH)  with  several  teams:  the  Inspection  Planning
Team, the Code of Conduct Team, and the Corruption Report Center Team with
inspection officers. In particular, the Corruption Report Center analyzes and manages
the reports of suspected corrupt conduct which are provided by personal visit, the
internet, counseling, telephone, mail, and fax. As of late December 2004, it has obtained
6,014 corruption reports and dealt with 18,673 counseling cases in a number of different
ways (KICAC, 2004: 46). KICAC received a total of 92 new cases of corruption in
2004, 89 of which were processed. KICAC referred 76 corruption reports among them
to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the National Police Agency or the Board of Audit and
Inspection, according to the type of suspected corrupt conduct (KICAC, 2004: 48). The
role of KICAC’s inspection is somewhat limited at this time, but it is expected to grow
over time.
Protection and Reward
The Anti-corruption Act specifies that the identity of informants should not be disclosed
without their consent and that they should not be discriminated against in terms of their
public positions as a result of reporting alleged corrupt behavior in good faith. KICAC
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ensured that the Protection and Reward Division officials deal with a whistle-blower
case with the help of the Corruption Report Center and the Inspection Officer. Since its
establishment in 2002, KICAC have handled 10 cased which related to the security of
public positions. In nine of those cases, it took protective steps by: transferring the
informants to other offices, getting them duly reinstated, ensuring personnel exchange,
imposing negligence fines, providing job placement service, or calling for disciplinary
actions; and KICAC awarded informants 173 million won in total for their reports,
which were decisive factors in recovering 2.73 billion won or so (KICAC, 2004: 65).
Assessment of Anti-Corruption Activities
Corruption-causing factors need to be quantified to better evaluate anti-corruption
efforts and their outcomes so that KICAC began conducting the “Integrity Assessment”
on government agencies and public service organizations to encourage their
involvement in anti-corruption efforts and to approach corruption issues scientifically.
The “level of integrity” refers to the degree to which public officials perform their
duties in a fair and transparent manner and without getting involved in fraud and
corruption (KICAC, 2004: 7). According to the 2004 Integrity Assessment, 22  the
integrity score averages 8.46 on a ten-point scale, up from 7.71 in 2003 and 6.43 in
2002 (KICAC, 2004: 77). The level of integrity has been on a steady increase because
target organizations worked to implement anti-corruption policies voluntarily.
Code of Conduct for Public Officials and Public Education
In  accordance  with  the  Article  8  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Act,  the  Code  of  Conduct  for
Public Officials (CCPO) went into force in 2003 to lay down behavioral guidelines for
public officials in their private and public life. Based on the CCPO, central and local
administrative agencies put their own codes of conduct in place, which reflect their
individual situation. Furthermore, KICAC developed anti-corruption training programs
for public officials. Anti-corruption education for public officials include: anti-
corruption expert course, training for public servants in charge of civil application and
registration, training by non-government institutions, and government agency’s in-house
training programs. On top of that, KICAC promoted its anti-corruption education,
22 Overall integrity is the arithmetical average of the integrity scores in each service area, with the sum of
the  weights  of  each  assessment  area  being  score  1  (KICAC,  2004:  72).  Overall  Integrity  =  Weight  X
(Perceived Integrity + Potential Integrity).
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especially about handling of reports, information and complaints by publishing news
briefs and placing ads on the internet, in subways, and in the publications of civil
organizations and public corporations.
In a nutshell, typical functions of the independent anti-corruption agency in several
Asian countries including Singapore and Hong Kong are investigation, prevention and
training. However, KICAC lacks investigative authorities because of strong opposition
of the Prosecutors’ Office and the Police. Instead, KICAC collects corruption reports
from citizens and requests investigations by the Prosecutors’ Office and the Police upon
the  receipt  of  corruption  reports  from  citizens.  Furthermore,  KICAC  only  deals  with
corruption in the public sector so that it does not handle corruption in the private sector,
while independent anti-corruption agencies in Singapore and Hong Kong deal with
corruption in the both public and private sectors. 23  In that regard, KICAC is not
regarded as a super-strong anti-corruption agency.
INTERNATIONAL EVALUATION: CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX
(CPI) AND GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER (GCB)
The South Korean Government established a basic anti-corruption infrastructure in
recent years and developed various anti-corruption policies and programs. Accordingly,
it would be interesting to see the evaluation from a professional international
organization such as the Transparency International (TI). TI provides useful quantitative
diagnostic tools regarding levels of transparency and corruption, both at global and local
levels.24
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
The annual TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), first released in 1995, is the best
known  of  TI’s  tools.  It  has  been  widely  credited  for  putting  TI  and  the  issue  of
corruption on the international policy agenda. The TI CPI ranks countries in terms of the
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians.25
23 KICAC has the Corporate Ethics Team in the Bureau of Public Relations and Cooperation.
24 For more details, see the Transparency International’s homepage at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/about.
25 Alan Doig et. Al (2006) warns that quantitative approaches have policy-relevant weaknesses when it
comes to assessing causes, patterns and trends of corruption, as well as acknowledging that an over-
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It is a composite index, a poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related data from expert
and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions.
The  TI  CPI  focuses  on  corruption  in  the  public  sector  and  defines  corruption  as  “the
abuse of public office for private gain.”26
The CPI 2006 ranks 163 countries in terms of perceived levels of corruption, as
determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. CPI Score relates to perceptions
of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges
between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Leading top ten countries in terms of
the  TI  CPI  are  as  follows:  (1)  Finland,  Iceland,  and  New  Zealand  received  the  same
highest score (9.6), followed by Denmark (9.5), Singapore (9.4), Sweden (9.2),
Switzerland (9.1), Norway (8.8), Australia (8.7), Netherlands (8.7), Austria (8.6),
Luxembourg (8.6), and United Kingdom (8.6).27 Countries in Northwestern Europe,
Northern America, and Oceania received high CPI scores. In general, there might be a
possible correlation between corruption and socioeconomic development, but
Northwestern European countries have an exceptionally high score. It seems that ethical
or cultural legacies brought a high CPI score in Northwestern European countries, but
more in-depth further studies might be necessary to explain this phenomenon.
Among Asian countries, Singapore had the highest score (9.4), followed by Hong Kong
(8.3), Japan (7.6), Taiwan (5.9), South Korea (5.1), and Malaysia (5.0), as shown in
Table 1.28 It seems that a super-strong anti-corruption agency model the so-called “the
Singahong Model” works effectively in both Singapore and Hong Kong. Since
Singapore’s CPIB was originally established by the British colonial government in
1952, Singapore’s anti-corruption policies have been effective.29 Hong Kong’s CPI is
also  high  and  such  score  could  as  a  result  of  the  performance  of  Hong Kong’s  ICAC.
reliance on scoring or rankings might overlook the fact that democratization and development may be
moving targets in terms of progress and direction.
26 The surveys used in compiling the CPI ask questions that relate to the misuse of public power for
private benefit, for example bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement
of public funds) or questions that probe the strength of anti-corruption policies, thereby encompassing
both administrative and political corruption.
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006/faq#general1.
27 Ibid.
28 Transparency International’s homepage for the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006.
29 A similar story can be told in Hong Kong, which was under British rule from 1841 to 1997 (Quah,
2004).
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South Korea’s rank is much lower than Singapore and Hong Kong, but it is improving
over time.
Table 1. Rank and Score of the TI CPI 2006 in Selected Asian Countries (Number of
Countries: 163).
 Country CPI Rank CPI Score*
Singapore 5 9.4
Hong Kong, PRC 15 8.3
Japan 17 7.6
Taiwan 34 5.9
South Korea 42 5.1
Malaysia 44 5.0
Thailand 63 3.6
China 70 3.3
India 70 3.3
Mongolia 99 2.8
Vietnam 111 2.6
Nepal 121 2.5
Philippines 121 2.5
Indonesia 130 2.4
Pakistan 142 2.2
Bangladesh 156 2.0
Myanmar 160 1.9
* The score ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).
Source: Transparency International’s homepage for the Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006.
South Korea’s CPI score is improving over time as shown in Table 2. South Korea’s CPI
score in 2000 was 4.0, but it was 5.1 in 2006. The rank is fluctuating due to increasing
number of participating countries in the surveys. A country’s score is a much more
important indication of the perceived level of corruption in a country. A country's rank
can change simply because new countries enter the index or others drop out.30 The
South Korean government is now aiming to increase its CPI score up to 7-8 points in
the near future.
30 If comparisons with previous years are made, they should only be based on a country's score, not its
rank, as outlined above. For more details, see TI’s homepage at
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006/faq.
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Table 2. Trends of CPI Score and Rank of South Korea, 1997-2006.
Year CPI Score CPI Rank Size of Sample (Number of
Countries)
1997 4.29 34 52
1998 4.2 43 85
1999 3.8 50 99
2000 4.0 48 90
2001 4.2 42 91
2002 4.5 40 102
2003 4.3 50 133
2004 4.5 47 146
2005 5.0 40 159
2006 5.1 42 163
Source: Transparency International’s homepage for the Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)
Transparency International produces several other surveys and indices in addition to the
CPI.  Among them,  the  Global  Corruption  Barometer  (GCB)  is  one  of  TI’s  key  global
tools for measuring corruption in assessing general public attitudes toward, and
experience of, corruption around the world. It asks respondents whether they or anyone
in their household has had contact during the past 12 months with seven familiar public
sector agencies, including the police, health services, education and so forth, and
whether they have had to pay bribes in their dealings with them.
The GCB 2006 reflects the findings of a survey of 59,661 people in 62 countries. The
GCB 2006 also shows experience of bribery in selected Asian countries. The GCB 2006
asked the following question: “in the past 12 months have you or anyone living in your
household  paid  a  bribe  in  any  form.”  In  South  Korea,  bribing  has  been  substantially
reduced in recent years: only two percent of respondents said that they paid bribes,
while over 10 percent of respondents in several countries (India, Pakistan, Philippines,
and Indonesia) said that they paid bribes in the past year, as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Experience of Bribery in Selected Asian Countries: Bribe-Paying in the Past
Year.
Country Yes (%) No (%)
Singapore 1 99
South Korea 2 98
Taiwan 2 98
Japan 3 97
Malaysia 3 97
Hong Kong 6 94
Thailand 10 90
India 12 88
Pakistan 15 85
Philippines 16 84
Indonesia 18 82
Source: TI Global Corruption Barometer 2006.31
For international comparison taken together, responses from African, Latin American
and newly independent states (NIS), countries indicate that frequent bribe-paying is the
common  social  norm  -  with  a  few  notable  exceptions  –  as  is  indicated  in  Table  4.  In
Asia-Pacific and Southeast Europe, bribe-paying was moderate, while in North America
and EU countries including other Western European nations bribes were seldom paid for
services. Among Asian countries, Hong Kong’s case is interesting to see because it had
a good score of CPI, but its GCB score was not good as shown in Table 4. The level of
corruption is a function of the honesty and integrity of both public officials and private
individuals; holding such factors constant, however, the size and incidence of bribes are
determined by the overall level of benefits available, the discretionary power of
officials, the riskiness of corrupt deals, and the relative bargaining power of briber and
bribee (Rose-Ackerman, 1997: 38).
31 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2006.
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Table 4. Countries Most Affected by Bribery.
Source: TI Global Corruption Barometer 2006.32
The GCB also provides data showing the extent to which people believe corruption
affects different public sectors and institutions in their country. This public perception of
the levels of corruption is a vital indicator of how corrupt or clean the average citizen
finds a number of key institutions. Such perceptions can influence the public’s dealings
with these institutions, creating the expectation that graft might be necessary to get
necessary services. The results of the GCB 2006 show that political parties and
parliament/legislature are perceived to be most affected by corruption as shown in Table
5.
Table 5. Sectors and Institutions Most Affected by Corruption.
Source: TI Global Corruption Barometer 2006.33
32 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2006.
33 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2006.
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In general, political parties were perceived as the most corrupt institutions in society
around the world. According to both TI GCB 2005 and 2006, political parties were
ranked as the institutions most affected by corruption, followed by
parliament/legislature, as shown in Table 5. Thus citizens called their political party
system into question and for innovation. Like many other countries, citizens in South
Korea have serious doubts about the integrity of their political parties and legislature.
Generally speaking, the public office election is highly costly in terms of campaigning,
advocating, and promoting a candidate’s popularity to win the election. Accordingly, a
prospective candidate is likely to receive illegal donations in order to cover campaign
expenses. In the past, South Korea had severe problems of corrupt election practices
over a long period. In 2004, however, a new step was taken to curb corrupt election
practices in the process of the public office election by the revision of the Public Office
Election Act. In particular, various articles related to the election campaign, finance, and
accounting have been substantially revised to enhance more transparency and integrity.
For  example,  the  revised  Public  Office  Election  Act  states  that  a  politician  should  not
provide any money, goods, foods, books, tours, and transportation to constituencies.
According to a newly added Article 261 of the Public Office Election Act revised in
2004, if a politician violates the law, he/she must pay “50 times of the original price
incurred” to the National Election Commission. Furthermore, if anybody reports such
illegal cases to the National Election Commission, he/she can get monetary rewards up
to 500,000,000 won (approximately US$532,000) from the National Election
Commission and secrecy of the informant’s identification is guaranteed.34 Since then,
corrupt practices in the process of the public office election have significantly declined.
Citizens in many developing countries signaled the police as a highly corrupt institution
(Sherman, 1978). According to the GCB 2006, respondents in African and Eastern
European countries indicated grave concerns about the integrity of the police.
Furthermore, concerns about the law and order sector (police, legal system, and
judiciary) are not limited to the police, but extend to the legal system and the judicial
bodies.
In South Korea, many citizens indicated several vulnerable areas for corruption
(KICAC, 2006). Among several public service areas, construction and building-related
34For more details, visit the National Election Commission’s homepage at http://www.nec.go.kr/english.
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areas received the highest score on the citizens’ perception survey on corrupt public
service areas, followed by tax, correction and customs service including the
prosecutor’s office, defense and military manpower, education, policy, health and
hygiene, environment, and procurement, as shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Citizens’ Perception on Corrupted Public Service Areas in South Korea.
Public Service Areas by Function 2003 2004 2005
Construction, Building, Housing, and
Land Development
72.6 71.3 73.9
Tax 58.1 59.4 54.0
Prosecutor, Correction, and Customs
Service
57.0 46.0 52.6
Defense and Military Manpower 54.6 51.9 52.3
Education 45.1 45.1 48.9
Police 51.3 54.9 48.0
Health and Hygiene 32.2 47.3 33.4
Environment 32.0 37.9 32.7
Procurement 27.4 36.1 26.0
Source: KICAC’s homepage at http://www.kicac.go.kr/.
Corruption  prone  areas  are  major  targets  for  administrative  reform  in  South  Korea
because they are potential high impact agencies for the general public who feel the
quality of public service everyday. Currently, the South Korean government is carrying
out administrative reform in six major vulnerable (wet) areas: construction, housing, tax
collecting, law enforcement, food-sanitation inspection, and environment regulation.
The South Korean government now regards anti-corruption as one of the most
important tasks that it has to resolve for successful administrative reform and national
development.
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY FOR CURBING CORRUPTION
The government’s anti-corruption convictions and an institutional framework by
themselves can’t thoroughly eradicate corruption. Only when there is continued
assistance from the private sector, such as monitoring and control by civil society, and
corporate reforms in governance and ethics, can public policies on anti-corruption work
effectively.
In South Korea, the citizens’ movement grew spontaneously from the late 1980s. By the
1990s, with the advancement of democracy and local autonomy, civil groups
experienced  rapid  grow both  in  terms  of  size  and  quality.  Some of  these  groups  made
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outstanding achievements indeed. Three major NGOs are briefly reviewed in the
following section: Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice; People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy; and Transparency International-Korea.
The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ),35 founded in 1989 was formed to
realize the Real Name Financial Transactions System in 1993. The most notable activity
of the CCEJ is the establishment of the "real name system" for all financial transactions
and for the registration of property. Currently, the CCEJ has expanded its membership
to 35 thousand and became one of the leading non-governmental organizations in South
Korea.
The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), established in 1994, also
developed a movement for chaebol (conglomerate) reform, political reform, and
eradication of corruption and improper practices.36 Since its establishment, the PSPD
has been serving as a leading watchdog against the abuse of power. It has developed
various activities to bring justice and democracy to many areas in Korean society.  The
Civil Actions for the 2000 General Election (the CAGE) 37  and the Minority
Shareholders' Campaign might be said to be their most noticeable activities.
Transparency International Korea (TI Korea) was founded in 1999 through a coalition
of civil organizations with the purpose, “To reform the awareness of people, to eliminate
widespread corruption in the society, and to contribute to the righteous construction of
society through anti-corruption movements.” 38  Recently, the Korean Pact on Anti-
Corruption and Transparency (K-PACT) was signed by representative figures from the
four  sectors  of  the  society  -  public,  private,  political  and  civil  society  -  in  a  pledge  to
create a corruption-free and transparent society. The K-PACT seeks to become a
sustainable movement for transparency through participation and agreement between
35 The Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) was formed in response to the unjust structure of
Korean economic life and it was founded in 1989 by some 500 people representing various walks of life:
economics professors and other specialists, lawyers, housewives, students, young adults and business
people. For more details, visit its homepage at http://www.ccej.or.kr/English.
36 Founded in 1994 by more than 200 members, the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
(PSPD) is a civil organization dedicated to promoting justice and human rights in Korean society through
the participation of the people. For more details, visit its homepage at http://eng.peoplepower21.org.
37 Nearly 5 hundreds of NGOs made coalition for the rejection campaign in 2000. For more details, visit
the PSPD’s homepage at http://info.peoplepower21.org/action/year.html#.
38 For more details, visit its homepage at http://www.ti.or.kr/engindex.htm.
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the four sectors to overcome corruption and further our society.39
These civil groups not only drafted various and practical policy alternatives to resolve
corruption and maladministration problems in South Korean society; they also acted as
major players in enacting anti-corruption legislation, the Anti-Corruption Act and the
Money Laundering Prevention Act. Thus, it is important to innovate, not only public
governance, but also a broad scale of governance in South Korean society by nurturing
civil society’s activities in public affairs.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Government-led economic development in the last decade had proliferated various
approval and authorization rules and regulations which increased opportunities for
public corruption in South Korea. In particular, the growth-oriented economic policy in
the past made it a custom that government awarded special privileges to certain
companies which, in return for special favors, provided illegal political funds to the
politicians who had influence in shaping government policy and operation (OPM,
1999). However, these are not the only causes for corruption. In fact, there are various
kinds of causes for corruption. First, administrative and institutional causes are:
unrealistic or unnecessary regulations, unclear definitions and operational standards in
laws including rules and regulations, complicated and intricate administrative
procedures; and low salaries and poor benefits for public officials. Second, social and
cultural causes are: collusive connections in the iron triangle,40 social structure which
supports highhanded personal administration and privileges for former government
officials, cultural environment encouraging unreasonable and inordinate treatment
including cash gifts (commonly given at celebrations to express gratitude and
commonly given at ceremonies to express congratulations and condolences). Third,
psychological and attitudinal causes are: low level of integrity and ethics in public
office, and prevalence of egotism, nepotism, regionalism, and academic cliques in
society  (OPM,  1999:  9).  Thus  the  South  Korean  government  must  find  a  way  to  deal
with each of these causes of corruption.
39 The K-PACT is based on TI's principle of coalition-building and a holistic approach and it is a proposal
from civil society to form an anti-corruption system through alliances among the public, political and
private sectors.
40 "Iron triangle" is a term used by political scientists to describe the policy-making relationship between
the legislature, the bureaucracy, and interest groups.
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South Korean governments have tried to eradicate corruption by introducing
institutional frameworks in addition to a number of new laws and regulations. Believing
that corruption was one of the main causes of the foreign currency crisis in 1997, South
Korean people also strongly demanded that the government exert all possible efforts to
eliminate corruption in both public and private sectors (OPM, 1999: 11). 41
Consequently, President Kim Dae-jung expressed a strong will in combating and
eradicating corruption, and pursued reforms in rules and regulations, and set up an
infrastructure for anti-corruption efforts by establishing the Anti-Corruption Act in 2001
and an independent corruption organization (KICAC) in 2002. President Rho Moo-hyun
also promoted administrative and institutional reforms and initiated public awareness
programs for anti-corruption, and invested resources more extensively for the
improvement of conditions for public officials.
Moreover, the current South Korean government is strengthening international ties and
cooperation with international organizations (such as OECD, IBRD, UN, and TI) as
well as other foreign countries for the purpose for curbing corruption. In fact, these
international organizations provide various kinds of tools and policy ideas for anti-
corruption. If a country is interested in anti-corruption, it can borrow useful ideas from
major international organizations without 'reinventing wheels' for corruption prevention.
Therefore, a critical matter for corruption eradication is to have a strong political will to
realistically adopt, and seriously implement, anti-corruption policies. In that regard, it
seems that, in recent years, the South Korean government has been more serious in
adopting and implementing major anti-corruption policy tools from toolboxes of various
international organizations than previous governments.
However, the government anti-corruption efforts have been largely limited to
investigation and punishment of alleged individual offenders. In other words, preventive
measures have been weak. Government should place more emphasis on prevention
rather than on reactive measures in combating corruption and prioritize on feasibility
and effectiveness of anti-corruption programs. Particularly, more specific reform plans
must be developed and implemented against corruption in vulnerable areas. In order to
do so, the role of KICAC's investigative powers in particular, should be enhanced in the
near future along with adequate staff and funding. As a matter of fact, the Singahong
41 The World Bank provided financial support (US$345,000) for the initiation of the South Korean
government’s efforts against corruption in 1998 (OPM, 1999: 7). It made a notable influence in the
development of anti-corruption policies in South Korea.
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model (super-strong independent agency model of Singapore and Hong Kong) was
successful in Singapore and Hong Kong. It has not only rigorous investigative methods
but also strong programs of prevention and public education based on high levels of
political and public support. KICAC has both prevention and public education
functions, but it currently lacks investigative authority.42
Since the 1990s, basic anti-corruption infrastructure and practical anti-corruption
measures have been installed in government. Thus, it is fair to say that the South Korean
government now laid a more or less realistic ethical foundation on which to build a fair
and transparent officialdom. As mentioned earlier, South Korea’s CPI score is
improving over time: South Korea’s CPI score in 2000 was 4.0, but it was 5.1 in 2006.
According to the GCB 2006, however, political life was emerged as the most affected
by corruption in South Korea.43 More than 70 percent of respondents living in South
Korea said that corruption affects political life to a large extent, while 31-50 percent of
respondents in Japan and Singapore think that their political lives are affected to a large
extent.44 Accordingly, political dispute, along with corruption in South Korea, is one of
the daunting tasks the South Korean government should deal with for further
advancement in the near future. Therefore, political leaders should commit themselves
in promoting transparency, accountability, integrity, and democratic governance in
societies around the world. The political sector is the area most distrusted by South
Korean citizens with a high degree of political  cynicism. The political  sector is  one of
major target areas for further reforms in South Korea.
Moreover, the battle for national integrity must be waged in all parts of society
including government, as well as the private sector and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).  Nowadays,  NGOs  are  a  core  component  of  civil  society  and  have  a  duty  in
holding  governments  accountable  and  transparent.  In  many  cases  NGOs  have  been
fighting corruption longer than the government or businesses. As the government
creates strategies for combating corruption, reformers must seek to incorporate the
42 Outside the Asia-Pacific region, however, the Anti-corruption Bureau in Tanzania, for example, faced
considerable public criticism particularly in the post Julius Nyerere years (TI, 1999: 87). Therefore, it is
worthy to consider the fact that having an independent anti-corruption agency does not guarantee the
success of corruption eradication because an independent anti-corruption agency model is unlikely to be
right for every country (Johnston, 1999: 225).
43 The GCB (TI, 2006) has also asked respondents to assess to what extent corruption affects different
spheres of life, including personal and family life, the business environment and political life on a scale of
1 (not at all) to 4 (to a large extent).
44 Ibid.
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views and experiences of NGOs from the beginning. NGOs help governments design
legislation and programs to implement strategies and make government into a more
open, transparent and participatory governance, creating an environment in which fraud
and corruption cannot thrive.
Transparent governance implies openness of the governance system through clear
processes and procedures, with easy access for citizens to public information. A high
level of transparency stimulates ethical awareness in public service through information
sharing, which ultimately ensures the accountability of the performance of individuals
and organizations handling resources and/or holding public office (Kim et al., 2005).
The word transparency carries with it a powerful array of moral and political
associations: honesty, guilelessness and openness (Best, 2005). Transparency requires
that  decisions  and  their  enforcement  are  done  in  a  manner  that  follows  rules  and
regulations. Transparency and its fruit, administrative health, is the sine-qua-non of
good governance and national integrity. The ultimate goal of national integrity is to
make corruption into a high risk and low return undertaking. Building national integrity
through corruption eradication in South Korea is a top priority to make a country more
competitive and trustworthy in the world.
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